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W e develop a model of oligopoly competition involving innovation effort, market entry and production flexibilityunder demand uncertainty. Several heterogeneous firms make efforts to develop new prototypes; if they succeed,
they hold a shared option to enter a new market under stochastic demand. We derive analytic results for the Markov per-
fect equilibrium accounting for development effort, market entry and production decisions and complement these by
numerical analyses. Firm value—which embeds real options—is not convex increasing in demand but exhibits “competi-
tive waves” due to market entries by rivals. A firm with a development advantage (“innovator”) exerts greater innovation
effort if the market is a niche, whereas another benefiting from economies of scale (“incumbent”) invests more if the mar-
ket is larger. Positive externalities benefit the incumbent in the development stage, whereas the innovator is better off in
counteracting negative externalities. Demand volatility raises firm incentives to innovate as it enhances the value of firm
market-entry and production flexibility.
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1. Introduction
Disruptive innovations have reshaped many estab-
lished industries causing incumbents to lose market
share or disappear altogether. Some firms are eager to
embrace disruptive innovation, while others are
inclined to leverage economies of scale from known
technologies. This tension between adapting to tech-
nological change and maintaining efficient produc-
tion lies behind Abernathy’s (1978) “productivity
dilemma.” For decades, established original equip-
ment manufacturers (OEMs), such as Ford, Toyota or
Volkswagen, have competed on product design and
marketing (rather than innovation) to attain econo-
mies of scale. These OEMs overlooked three disrup-
tive innovations: electric vehicles (EVs), car sharing,
and autonomous driving. Tesla, initially a niche
player in the luxury EV segment, is poised to become
a mass producer, attaining a market cap larger than
Ford’s. EVs existed a century before Tesla’s roadster
(2006). In the 1900s, a third of the cars in NYC, Boston,
and Chicago were electric. Yet, by the 1920s, EVs were
less viable than Ford’s gasoline-powered model T.
Uber aspires to make ride-hailing so cheap and con-
venient that people might forgo car ownership; by
2030, car sharing may account for 25% of global driv-
ing (Economist 2016b). This trend is consistent with a
general shift towards servicitation (Karmarkar et al.
2015). High-tech conglomerate Alphabet (Google) is
leveraging on its computing power to become the lead-
ing exponent of autonomous driving (Economist
2016a). Autonomous driving has been technologically
feasible since the EUREKA-PROMETHEUS project in
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the early 1990s (Daimler 2016, Dickmanns 2002). How-
ever, it was not commercially viable because the sidelin-
ing technologies were unreliable and prohibitively
expensive. With these hurdles lifted, commercializing
the technology may now be around the corner.
Often the emergence of a new dominant product
design or category creates a narrow “window of oppor-
tunity,” which ends when production efficiency (rather
than product innovation) becomes the key value driver
(Christensen et al. 1998, Klepper 2002, Suarez et al.
2015). As the “window of opportunity” for embracing
these disruptive innovations is closing, some OEMs are
now undergoing dramatic changes in their strategies,
at the risk of accelerating the decline of the “traditional
car.” Volkswagen announced a radical plan to address
these three disruptions (Wall Street Journal 2016).
Audi, BMW, and Daimler are building a technology
platform for autonomous driving, having acquired
HERE’s digital mapping capabilities. The OEMs’ suc-
cess in adopting these disruptive innovations will
likely determine whether they can sustain or expand
their market shares. Automotive experts believe that
product differentiation will play a lesser role (Roland
Berger Strategy Consultants 2014) with production effi-
ciency becoming the lead to profitability. The key com-
ponents of the “car of the future,” such as electric
drives and batteries, will be more generic than those of
traditional cars. Autonomous driving optimized for
safety and seamless system integration is less likely to
enhance driving pleasure, making BMW’s “Freude am
Fahren” potentially obsolete. Regulators will likely
favor simpler, tested basic components. Car sharing
and ongoing urbanization in emerging markets are
likely to give a push to easy-to-use standardized vehi-
cles, an expected feature of mobility solutions for
future smart cities (Qi and Shen 2019). As process inno-
vation and cost efficiency take over, the window of
opportunity is closing fast with late movers locked out.
Virtual reality (VR) is another disruptive innovation
and product category becoming ripe for market entry.
The underlying technology (sensors, algorithms and
VR headset) are becoming fairly standard and com-
moditized. For instance, the sensors used for positional
tracking get smaller, better and more affordable. Man-
ufacturers are less likely to differentiate on product
design and prices but on economies of scale. As VR
headsets become commoditized, the opportunity to
enter this new market (following Facebook’s, Sony’s
and HTC’s entry) may also be short-lived.
The above two industries facing disruptive innova-
tions have some common features. In both cases, the
research phase has reached maturity. Rival firms must
next decide whether to develop a prototype meeting
certain regulatory requirements and customer demands
as well as satisfying some production efficiency criteria.
Some degree of uncertainty remains as to whether a
specific firm’s prototype will meet these hurdles. Some
firms may have a headstart in the development phase,
e.g., may already have first results from pilot programs.
If a prototype proves viable, a firm can decide whether
or not to commercialize the innovation and launch the
new product category. These market-entry decisions
will depend on the state of future demand (which can-
not be readily forecast at present) as well as on how
many (and which) rivals succeed at developing compet-
ing viable prototypes. Product differences are likely to
be short-lived as these innovations rest on a common
technology base. Consequently, process optimization
(attaining economies of scale and cost efficiency)
becomes the key success factor in the later stage. Fol-
lowing their market entry, invested firms are able to
adjust production in light of realized demand, expand-
ing production if the new product category performs
well beyond the niche market of early adopters (e.g., in
autonomous driving) or possibly even shutting down
production if the market surge was due to a “hype.”
We develop a dynamic game to capture the essential
features of the above settings. Heterogeneous oligopoly
firms facing technological and market uncertainty must
decide first on their development efforts and then on
their market entry decisions within a narrow window
of opportunity. We adopt an asymmetric Cournot
model for the production decisions following market
entry assuming process optimization prevails over pro-
duct differentiation in the mid-to-long term. Our frame-
work explores a new territory involving the interplay
among technology development, market-entry and flex-
ible production decisions in heterogeneous oligopoly
under uncertainty. We present analytic results, which
we complement by numerical analyses. Specifically, we
derive a closed-form expression for the value of the flex-
ibility to adjust production to stochastic demand in oli-
gopoly, generalizing the Black–Scholes–Merton (BSM)
formula (see Black and Scholes 1973, Merton 1973) to
accommodate strategic interactions, production flexibil-
ity and cost heterogeneity. Firm value expressions
reflect sustained current operations as well as upside
expansion potential and shut down options. We address
the “coordination game” among firms seeking to enter a
new market and derive the expected discounted value
attained for given development efforts. We then investi-
gate numerically the equilibrium development efforts
by several asymmetric rival firms. We show that firm
value is not always convex increasing in the state of
demand, but may exhibit “competitive waves” close to
the rivals’ market-entry thresholds (as the payoff drops
with each new rival entry). In addition, we investigate
to what extent different firm profiles in terms of devel-
opment and production capabilities influence the firms’
choices of upfront technology development efforts.
Finally, we examine the effect of positive or negative
externalities on firms’ development efforts.
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2. Literature Review
Our article relates to literature streams on real options,
industrial organization, production flexibility, innovation
and strategic investment under uncertainty. By con-
trast, we account for more firms and for heterogeneity
among rivals as well as output flexibility with econo-
mies of scale in production. Beside making (binary)
market-entry decisions, firms have flexibility to con-
tinuously adjust their production decisions to
demand realization, rather than switch from one
“production mode” to another. In our setting, oligo-
poly firms directly influence the price-setting process
with firm profits and values being convex in the state
of demand.
Production flexibility enables a firm to limit the
downside risk of operations by curtailing or shutting
down production while tapping on favorable upside
demand surges to expand production. Real options anal-
ysis (ROA) allows quantifying the firm’s flexibility to
adapt to exogenous market changes and estimate the
value of production flexibility under uncertainty (see,
e.g., Dixit and Pindyck 1994, Smith and Nau 1995, Tri-
georgis 1996). This is facilitated by capitalizing on an
analogy between financial and real options. While
strategic interactions are less significant in efficient
capital markets, business situations are replete with
strategic real options shared with industry rivals.
Industrial organization (IO) (see, e.g., Tirole 1988) pro-
vided prescriptive guidance into how strategic interac-
tions affect firm behavior. ROA and IO were recently
brought together—via “option games”—allowing dee-
per insights into industry dynamics (e.g., Chevalier-
Roignant and Trigeorgis 2011, Chevalier-Roignant
et al. 2011, Smit and Trigeorgis 2004).
Several articles in operations management discuss
how to mitigate business risk with financial or opera-
tional hedging (see, e.g., Huchzermeier and Cohen
1996, Kogut and Kulatilaka 1994, Van Mieghem 2003).
Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994) analyze a firm with a glo-
bal manufacturing footprint that can hedge against
foreign exchange fluctuations by shifting production
among its network of plants under different currency
regimes. Such models view production flexibility as a
switching option among discrete production modes.
We consider a broader class of production schedules,
ranging from idle operations at low demand to
expanding production at high demand.
Real options analysis has also proven useful to ana-
lyze problems related to development efforts or inno-
vation investment (see, e.g., Grenadier and Weiss 1997,
Huchzermeier and Loch 2001, McGrath and Nerkar
2004, Oriani and Sobrero 2008, Weeds 2002). McGrath
and Nerkar (2004) stress the compatibility of ROA
with motives to conduct R&D. Huchzermeier and
Loch (2001) consider the role of uncertainty, using
ROA to assess R&D flexibility. We here consider
development efforts to enhance the value of the
option to later commercialize the technology and
compete with rivals. Several authors (e.g., Anupindi
and Jiang 2008, Kouvelis and Tian 2014, Kulatilaka
and Perotti 1998, Swinney et al. 2011, Van Mieghem
and Dada 1999) analyze strategic investment under
uncertainty based on two-stage models where a firm
makes a first-stage (e.g., capacity) investment that
influences rival behavior in a later stage.
The article closest to ours is Kulatilaka and Perotti
(1998) where two firms face a decision to enter a new
market, receiving Cournot duopoly profits in a one-
shot game. A Stackelberg leader can invest in an effi-
cient production technology reducing future unit cost;
such an investment results in greater convexity of sec-
ond-stage Cournot profits. The authors derive the
investment option value in a duopoly. Our paper
expands upon this model in several respects. First, we
generalize to more than two heterogeneous firms in oli-
gopoly. We further assume firms compete repeatedly a
la Cournot (rather than one-shot) and incorporate pro-
duction flexibility. Third, we address the multiplicity of
pure-strategy Nash Equilibria (NE) and solve the coor-
dination game at the market entry time. We thus derive
a more general value expression for the market-entry
option in oligopoly and further examine the incentives
of firms to exert innovation efforts.
3. Model Setup and Solution
Approach
We consider a game among m 2 N rival firms made
up of two stages as shown in Figure 1: a development
stage (0, T) and a production stage (T, ∞). We use a
filtered probability space ðX; F ; ðF tÞt 0; PÞ to accom-
modate uncertainty. A firm’s success Si : X ! f0; 1g
indicates whether (1) or not (0) firm i’s prototype
meets a set of technical, regulatory, and profitability
criteria. Firm successes are assumed to be indepen-
dent events. At the outset (t = 0), firm i’s probability
of success is i ¼ PðSi ¼ 1jF 0Þ: firm imay start from
scratch (if i ¼ 0) or enjoy a headstart (if i [ 0). We
note  ¼ ðiÞi 2 ½0; 1m the vector of probabilities.
Over the development stage (0, T), firm i can exert
development effort Di to improve its probability of
success from i to Kiði; DÞ, where D ¼ ðDiÞi 2 Rmþ;
firm i’s effort is not observed by rivals when they
decide on their own efforts Di 2 Rm1. Function
Di 7!Ki

i;

Di
Di

is concave increasing on Rþ
from i to 1; its curvature captures firm i’s
innovativeness.
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Firm i’s innovation success is revealed by market-
entry time T. We use upper case Si : X ! f0; 1gwhen
the success state is unknown and lower case si 2 f0; 1g
once it is revealed. We note by s 2 f0; 1gm the state of
firms’ successes. At time T, each rival firm i decides
whether to enter the market given demand uncertainty
and the threat of rival entry; firm i’s decision variable is
i 2 f0; 1g and the market-entry state is  2 f0; 1gm.
Market entry is not feasible if firm i fails to develop a
viable prototype (si ¼ 0). Market-entry time T is
known from the outset (given an anticipated narrow
window of opportunity) and is not part of firms’ strate-
gies.1 When entering the market firm i incurs a firm-
specific sunk cost of Ii to set up new production lines
and distribution networks and promote the technol-
ogy. Firms are ranked in terms of increasing market-
entry costs: Ii  Iiþ1. In a manufacturing industry, an
incumbent may leverage on existing production lines
and its network of resellers, while market entrants start
from scratch. It is meaningful to interpret low-indexed
(low-cost) firms as large incumbents and high-indexed
(high-cost) firms as smaller start-up entrants.
During the production stage (t > T), firm i faces
affine-quadratic production costs,
CiðqiÞ :¼ fi þ dqi þ ciq2i ; fi; d; ci 0: ð1Þ
The cost parameter d in Equation (1) is homoge-
neous across firms: it represents the (linear) cost
incurred to source inputs from competitive suppli-
ers. Firms differ in their ability to exploit economies
of scale, as captured by the firm-specific quadratic
cost term ci. Given the assumption ci  ciþ1, incum-
bents are better at exploiting economies of scale.
Incumbents may also achieve lower fixed produc-
tion costs fi owing to economies of scope, so
fi  fiþ1. Overall, incumbents enjoy lower unit costs.
Firm i’s profit,
piðx;QÞ ¼ pðx;QÞ qi  Ci qið Þ ð2Þ
depends on the state of demand x 2 Rþ and the
firms’ output decisions Q 2 Rm. In line with Kulati-
laka and Perotti (1998) and Van Mieghem and Dada
(1999), we assume linear demand,
pðx;QÞ ¼ x b
X
i 1
qi; b[ 0; ð3Þ
where the demand intercept ðXt; t  0Þ follows a
geometric Brownian motion of the form:
dXt ¼ lXt dtþ rXt dBt; X0 ¼ x ð[ 0Þ: ð4Þ
Parameter l (≥0) captures the risk-neutral growth
rate, r (>0) is the (constant) demand volatility, and
ðBt; t  0Þ is a standard P-Brownian motion. The
sources of uncertainty for market demand and tech-
nological development are uncorrelated. The firm
can mitigate certain risks through replication or
hedging activities, which allows one to adjust the
drift of the stochastic process for the underlying
riskiness, enabling discounting future risk-adjusted
cash-flows at the risk-free interest rate q. According
to Birge (2000), option-pricing theory offers a rigorous
way to incorporate risk aversion in linear cash-flow
payoffs without relying on utility functions. If firm
profit value risks to suddenly drop (to nil) at a Pois-
son arrival rate ϱ ≥ 0—due, for instance, to drastic
new regulation or competitive erosion—then the dis-
count rate can be adjusted to r := q + ϱ (see, e.g., Mer-
ton 1976 or the notion of “exponential decay” in Dixit
and Pindyck 1994, pp. 200–204). The variable x is
used here to indicate either the demand state—known
at the time of decision—or the initial value of the
stochastic demand process ðXt; t  0Þ. This second
notation for x is used in combination with the condi-
tional expectation operator Ex under the risk-neutral
or equivalent martingale probability measure P.
Firm i’s strategy, /i, amounts to deciding on (i) the
innovation efforts Di during the development stage
(0, T); (ii) whether to launch the product at time T,
i 2 f0; 1g; and (iii) a production rate qiðtÞ considering
the demand realization Xt and rivals’ output deci-
sions QiðtÞ. The Cournot-game structure for (iii) is
applicable to our industry examples as product differ-
entiation loses significance as the “window of oppor-
tunity” closes and firms play a capacity game (see
Kreps and Scheinkman 1983, for the relation between
capacity and output decisions).
We solve for the Markov perfect equilibrium of the
dynamic game, obtaining a profile of strategies
ð/Hi ; /HiÞ in the class of Markov or feedback policies
that yields a Markov Nash equilibrium (MNE) in each
demand state x (see also Fudenberg and Tirole 1991,
Ch. 13). When firm i decides at the outset on its efforts
Di over the development period (0, T), it knows the
current state of demand x and the initial probabilities
of prototype development successes k. Yet, firm i does
not observe rivals’ efforts Di during the develop-
ment stage but forms beliefs based on the NE concept.
At market-entry time T, firm i knows which rivals
t = 0:
m ﬁrms decide on their
development eﬀorts D
t = T :
A subset of ﬁrms succeed at developing a viable prototype
and decide whether to enter the market
∀t > T :
Firms entering the market
adjust production schedule to demand
Time t
Development stage Production stage
Figure 1 Model Setup with Decision Stages
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have successfully developed viable prototypes (the
technology state s 2 f0; 1gm). This is reasonable
because many rival firms are publicly listed and face
pressures to report their achievements to sharehold-
ers. Finally, in the production stage (t > T), firm i
knows the identity of producing rivals (the state
 2 f0; 1gm) and infers rival outputs from the NE con-
cept. Cost and demand functions (including the inter-
cept dynamics) and the firms’ risk preferences are
assumed public knowledge.
Our solution approach proceeds backwards. First,
we obtain the outputs and profits of all producing
firms in MNE. We then derive the value of an
invested firm enjoying production flexibility (at mar-
ket-entry time T), analyze the resulting market-entry
game and identify the equilibrium. We express the
value of developing a prototype in closed form and
determine the (equilibrium) development effort each
firm exerts.
4. Product-Market Competition
4.1. Flexible Production Decisions
The MNE, noted Q^ðx; Þ or Q^, is the output vector from
which no firm i has an incentive to unilaterally deviate:
p^iðx; Þ :¼ piðx; Q^Þ piðx; ðqi; Q^iÞÞ; 8qi 0;
where Q^i 2 Rm1þ are the outputs produced by all
other rival firms except firm i. We define
NðÞ :¼
P
i
i
Q
j 6¼iðbþ 2cjÞjQ
jðbþ 2cjÞj
ð5Þ
and introduce factor
HiðÞ :¼ bþ ciðbþ 2ciÞ2
1
1þ bNðÞ
 2
1fi¼1g ð6Þ
noting the indicator function by 1fg. We next
establish in Proposition 1 firm i’s equilibrium profit.
We use the notation “” in 0   to signify that
0j  j; 8j and 9j : 0j [ j and aþ :¼ maxfa; 0g.
Proofs are provided in the online appendices.
PROPOSITION 1. Firm i’s profit in state ðx; Þ 2 Rþ
f0; 1gm is
p^iðx; Þ ¼ HiðÞ ðx dÞþ
 2fi: ð7Þ
Profit x 7! p^iðx; Þ is convex increasing, but decreases
with the number of invested firms
P
j j. Furthermore, (a)
HiðÞ  HjðÞ if ci\ cj, (b) Hið0Þ\HiðÞ if 0  , and
(c) firm i is worse off if it competes with firms enjoying
larger economies of scale.
Firm i will not produce if demand x is lower than
the linear cost (x < d) though it incurs a fixed cost fi.
If demand is larger (x ≥ d), firm i’s profit grows
(with demand x) in a convex manner at a rate dri-
ven by HiðÞ given in Equation (6).2 A firm benefit-
ing from economies of scale earns more than a
disadvantaged rival [due to property (a) in Proposi-
tion 1].
Assuming negligible costs in adjusting output, firm
value Wiðx; Þ obtains as the expected discounted
sum of the profits in Equation (1), that is,
Wiðx; Þ : ¼ max
qiðÞ  0
Ex
Z 1
0
ertpi

Xt; ðqiðtÞ; Q^iðtÞÞ
	
dt
 
¼ Ex
Z 1
0
ertp^iðXt; Þ dt
 
:
If firm i operates (x ≥ d), it makes a gross profit
value of HiðÞ½x  d2. One can give a probabilistic
interpretation to
wiðx; Þ :¼ HiðÞ x
2
r 2l r2  2
xd
r lþ
d2
r

 
ð8Þ
as the perpetuity value of such gross profits; this
interpretation is meaningful only if
r[ 2lþ r2; ð9Þ
which is a reasonable assumption given that the
drift l in Equation (4) is the risk-neutral drift
(rather than the actual growth rate). We next intro-
duce the parameters3
cA=B :¼ 
l r2=2
r2
	
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
l r2=2
r2
 2
þ 2r
r2
s
;
cB\0\1\cA;
ð10Þ
and the function wA=Bi given by
wA=Bi ðd; Þ
:¼ HiðÞd
2
cA  cB
2 cB=A
r 2l r2  2
1 cB=A
r l 
cB=A
r

 
:
ð11Þ
We further note wi ¼ wAi  wBi . The term wAi ðx; Þ is
the portion of firm i’s gross profit perpetuity value
attributable to scenarios where future demand Xt
exceeds current demand x, while the term
wBi ðx; Þ captures scenarios where Xt is lower
than current demand x. This decomposition of
perpetuity value wiðx; Þ helps distinguish among
cases of demand upsurge or contraction. As
demand fluctuates, a flexible firm will adjust its
production in view of demand realizations, bene-
fiting from demand surges by expanding capacity
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or reducing its market exposure by contracting or
shutting down production should demand fall.
Proposition 2 gives the firm value under such pro-
duction flexibility.
PROPOSITION 2. Assuming Equation (9) holds, if i ¼ 1
then firm i’s value with production flexibility in state
ðx; Þ 2 Rþ  f0; 1gm is given by
Wiðx; Þ :¼ 
fi
r þ xd
 	cAwAi ðd; Þ; x\d;
 fir þ wi x; ð Þ þ xd
 	cBwBi ðd; Þ; x d:
(
ð12Þ
Further, x 7!Wiðx; Þ is convex increasing from fi=r to
∞ and Wiðx; 0Þ\Wiðx; Þ if 0  .
Value Wiðx; Þ in Equation (12) is comprised of
terms reflecting changes to the production rate in
response to changes in demand. If firm i is currently
idle (x < d), it incurs recurring fixed (e.g., mainte-
nance) cost fi—having perpetuity value fi=r—but it
also receives perpetual gross profit value should
demand x exceed d. The growth (expansion) option
value term, wAi ðd; Þðx=dÞcA , can be interpreted as a
forward perpetuity value, wAi ðd; Þ, received at future
time sAðx; dÞ :¼ infft  0jXt  dg and discounted
back to the present with the factor
Ex½ersAðx;dÞ ¼ ðx=dÞcA . If demand is large (x ≥ d), firm
i receives, beside the perpetuity value of present oper-
ations wiðx; Þ in Equation (8) and the perpetuity of
fixed maintenance cost fi=r, a downside value adjust-
ment, wBi ðd; Þðx=dÞcB , capturing savings from produc-
tion shutdown when Xt falls below d.
4.2. Firm Market-Entry Decisions
We next analyze firms’ market-entry decisions, noted
 2 EðsÞ :¼ f 2 f0; 1gmj 
 sg. Let
Viðx; Þ :¼
h
Wiðx; Þ  Ii
i
1 i¼1f g ð13Þ
be the payoff received by firm i upon market entry.
EquilibriumMarket-Entry Choices. Consider first a
game between m = 2 symmetric firms both with viable
prototypes [s ¼

1
1

]. The functions x 7!V1

x;

1
0

¼
V2

x;

0
1

and x 7!V1

x;

1
1

¼ V2

x;

1
1

admit unique roots due to the monotonicity of
x 7!Wiðx; Þ shown in Proposition 2. These roots,
noted x ð0Þ and x ð1Þ, satisfy x ð0Þ\ x ð1Þ. If demand
x is sufficient to accommodate entry by both firms
(x  x ð1Þ), each has a dominant strategy to enter,
resulting in MNE ^ðx; sÞ ¼

1
1

. If demand is not suf-
ficient for either firm to enter profitably (x\ x ð0Þ),
both have a dominant strategy to stay out, resulting in
MNE ^ðx; sÞ ¼

0
0

. If demand is sufficient to accom-
modate only one firm (x ð0Þ  x\ x ð1Þ), there is no
dominant strategy: if one decides to stay out, its rival
should enter, but if one firm enters, its rival should
stay out. In this case, there are two pure-strategy
MNE ^ðx; sÞ ¼
n
1
0

;

0
1
o
, offering asymmetric
payoffs. A third MNE in mixed strategies also exists.
The above arising at intermediate demand gives rise to
a coordination problem. Because the option value term
[ðxdÞcAwAi ðd; Þ] in Equation (12) is positive, we cannot
readily rank the threshold d vs. the boundaries xð0Þ
and xð1Þ: a firm may enter and not produce for a while
if it expects more favorable market development in the
future.
If there is asymmetry among the two firms, we need
to consider the ranking of x vs. four roots (rather than
two). If heterogeneity is so pronounced that the most
efficient firm can sustain a duopoly, while its rival
cannot, then multiplicity of equilibria at intermediate
demand does not arise. The sole MNE is the one
where the most efficient firm enters, while the rival
stays out.
More generally, in an asymmetric oligopoly, let si
be the vector of rivals with successful prototypes that
are not firm i. Consider i 
 si and let xiðiÞ denote
the root of x 7!Viðx;

1
i

Þ, which is unique. Assum-
ing si ¼ 1, firm i’s best responseRiðx; iÞ is
Ri x; ið Þ ¼ 1 ð
00Enter00Þ; x xiðiÞ;
0 ð00Stay out00Þ; x\xiðiÞ:


ð14Þ
Given asymmetry, the identity of potential rivals
matters [the function Wi in Equation (12) depends
on the vector e]. Among the set of N(s) successful
firms, let jlðsÞ be the (index of the) firm ranked lth
in increasing quadratic cost cl. [We drop the
dependence on vector s when no confusion arises.]
Determining all demand thresholds xjlðjlÞ can be
a daunting task. First, one needs to determine for
each successful firm (N firms in total) the thresh-
old above which it will enter for all possible
industry structures: monopoly, duopoly, etc. Sec-
ond, firm jl’s demand threshold for a given indus-
try structure is not unique, but depends on rival
identities/indexes. In brief, for each firm jl, we
need to determine the demand threshold corre-
sponding to any permutation in sjl , resulting in
N  2N1 demand thresholds in total. Determining
all these demand thresholds is of essence because,
as per the reaction functions in (14), each firm jl’s
incentive to enter the market depends on whether
the demand state x is below or above such
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thresholds. Because asymmetry relates to the
parameters ci, fi and Ii, there is no obvious rank-
ing of demand thresholds for a given success sce-
nario s. Above the demand level xnjl firm jl can
produce profitably alongside the n most cost-effi-
cient firms. If demand is very low (½0; x0j1 ) or very
large (½xN1jN ; 1Þ) the MNE is unique. A coordina-
tion problem may arise in the intermediate
demand regions ½xl1jl ; xljlþ1  if, e.g., two firms j1 and
j2 can enter profitably in a monopoly but not in a
duopoly—in which case either market entry is a
Nash equilibrium. [In the Appendix S1 we deter-
mine all pure-strategy MNE entry decisions for
simple industry structures.]
Equilibrium Selection. As discussed, the MNE is
not necessarily unique. To overcome this obstacle,
we refine our solution concept by employing
Schelling’s (1960) “focal-point argument.” Here we
consider the MNE that achieves the largest pro-
ducer surplus as being “focal” among all possible
MNE (following an argument in Fudenberg and
Tirole 1991, section 1.2.4). Common sense suggests
that if incumbents and start-ups hold a disruptive
technology, the former are more likely to enter the
market in case of a coordination problem as they
would not want to be displaced by newcomers.
An alternative solution approach would be to
leave market-entry decisions to chance with firms
using mixed strategies. This approach, however,
does not actually solve the coordination problem.
It rather identifies yet another Nash equilibrium in
an augmented strategy space and is at odds with
fundamental principles in managerial decision-
making (Cachon and Netessine 2006).
Proposition 3 below characterizes the focal MNE
entry decisions. Leveraging on the MNE in Proposition
3, we compute N demand thresholds (namely
x0j1 ; x
1
j2
; x2j3 ; . . .; x
N1
jN
): firms j1; . . .; jl enter profitably in
an industry structure with exactly l firms if
x 2 ðxl1jl ; xljlþ1Þ. A market entrant does not necessarily
produce immediately (if x < d) but may wait for a
while before commercializing its technology.
PROPOSITION 3. In state ðx; sÞ 2 Rþ  S the MNE entry
decisions that achieve the largest producer surplus are
~ðx; sÞ ¼
ð0Þ; x 2 0;x0j1	;
½1j¼j1;...;jl
½0j6¼j1;...;jl
 
; x 2 xl1jl ;xljlþ1	; l¼ 1; . . .;N 1;
s; x 2 xN1jN ;1	:
8>><
>>:
ð15Þ
We here recall the definition of Vi in Equation (13)
and the characterization of the MNE that maximizes
producer surplus ~ðx; sÞ in Equation (15). Let
~Viðx; sÞ :¼ Viðx; ~ðx; sÞÞ denote firm i’s equilibrium
payoff in state (x, s) at time T.
5. Development Stage
We discussed how the game unfolds for t ≥ T. We
next consider the development stage (0, T) to deter-
mine firms’ efforts at developing a prototype. We pro-
ceed in several steps. We first determine the value of
each firm’s shared option to enter the market under
given prototype success probabilities K ¼ Kð; DÞ ¼
ðKiði; DÞÞi. Subsequently, we introduce an iterative
scheme to characterize the equilibrium development
efforts D^ ¼ ðD^iÞi of all m firms.
5.1. Incentives to Develop Prototype
Firm i’s prototype success Si follows a Bernoulli trial
with probability Kiði; DÞ. The number of successful
firms, |S| = N, which thus follows a Poisson-bino-
mial distribution, is of limited use because any per-
mutation in vector s leads to a distinct value
Viðx; ~ðx; sÞÞ. We thus need to consider the probabil-
ity, PKðS ¼ sÞ, of each draw of s 2 f0; 1gm [2m possi-
bilities in total], rather than the aggregate metrics
PKðjSj ¼ NÞ [m + 1 in total]. Because prototype suc-
cesses and the market demand are assumed indepen-
dent, the present value of firm i’s shared option to
enter the market is
Uiðx;KÞ :¼
X
s2S
PKðS ¼ sÞ  uiðx; sÞ; ð16Þ
where
uiðx; sÞ :¼ erT Ex ~ViðXT; sÞ: ð17Þ
We next obtain an expression for uiðx; sÞ that gener-
alizes the BSM European option formula to a multi-
stage oligopoly setting. Here, the realization of random
demand XT entails strategic interactions among hetero-
geneous firms, leading to the MNE ~ðXT; sÞ in Proposi-
tion 3. Also the payoff ~Við; sÞ is a (piecewise)
“polynomial” function [because ofWið; Þ in Equation
(12)], while it is (piecewise) affine in the standard BSM
model. Lemma 1 helps decompose uið; sÞ in Equation
(17). To proceed, define the terms
QðcÞ ¼ r cl 1
2
cðc 1Þr2; c 2 R; ð18Þ
Nzc :¼ N
ln ðx=zÞ þ lþ ðc 12Þr2
 
T
r
ﬃﬃﬃ
T
p
 
; ð19Þ
where N() stands for the standard cumulative nor-
mal distribution function.
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LEMMA 1. For T ≥ 0,
Ex e
rTXcT 1fXT  zg
  ¼ xceQðcÞTNzc; c 2 R: ð20Þ
The term xceQðcÞT on the right-hand side (RHS) of
Equation (20) is the present value of a forward con-
tract paying an amount XcT at future time T. The factor
Nzc on the RHS of Equation (20) indicates the contin-
gency of receiving XcT only if XT exceeds threshold z.
The “state price” of receiving 1 if XT exceeds thresh-
old z at T obtains as special case by setting c = 0 in
Equation (20). The BSM formula for a European call
option with payoff x 7! ðx  zÞþ where z is the
option’s strike price readily obtains as special case by
setting c = 1 and c = 0 in Equation (20).4 In contrast to
the “power” payoff function of Lemma 1, we consider
below a polynomial function corresponding to firm i’s
payoff involving various demand regions and thresh-
olds. For Proposition 4, we recall the expressions for
HiðÞ and wA=Bi in Equations (6) and (8), respectively,
and introduce the functions
tiðx; Þ :¼

wiðx; Þ  erT

Ii þ fi
r

þ
 x
d
cA
wAi ðd; Þ


1 NdcA

þ
 x
d
cB
wBi ðd; ÞNdcB

1fi¼1g
ð21Þ
wiðx; Þ :¼
HiðÞ x2 e
ðr2lr2ÞTNd2
r2lr2 2xd
eðrlÞTNd1
rl þd
2 e
rTNd0
r
( )
:
ð22Þ
PROPOSITION 4. (SHARED REAL OPTION VALUE). The
function ui in Equation (17) admits the functional
representation
uiðx; sÞ ¼
XN1
l¼1
ti x;
½1j¼j1;...;jl
½0j 6¼j1;...;jl
  
N
xl1
jl
0  N
xl
jlþ1
0
 
þ ti x;
½1j¼j1;...;jN
½0j 6¼j1;...;jN
  
N
xN1jN
0 ; ð23Þ
where N and j1; . . .; jN are deterministic functions of
state s and Nzc is given in Equation (19).
To interpret (23), consider its components. Here, we
face two parallel demand partitions. First, firm value
Wi in (2) admits different analytic expressions
depending on future demand XT being above or
below threshold d. Second, following Proposition 3,
we consider different equilibrium outcomes depend-
ing on the demand regions ½xl1jl ; xljlþ1Þ in which future
demand XT falls. The expression for uiðx; sÞ in
Equation (23) considers the second demand partition-
ing, while tiðx; Þ in Equation (21) embeds the first.
Expression (23) decomposes the option value uiðx; sÞ
into several mutually exclusive components,
ti
 
x;
 
½1j¼j1;...;jl
½0j6¼j1;...;jl
!!
, weighting each using
N
xl1
jl
0  N
xl
jlþ1
0 [and N
xN1
jN
0 for l = N]. The term
ti
 
x;
 
½1j¼j1;...;jl
½0j 6¼j1;...;jl
!!
gives firm i’s option value when
it invests as one of l successful firms. Certain
adjustments are noted: the relevant demand state for
tiðx; Þ is known at time T, which involves discount-
ing and accounting for the probability distribution of
XT, with term N
d
c ; c ¼ 0; 1; 2; cA; cB reflecting
whether the demand realization falls above or below
threshold d.
5.2. Equilibrium Development Efforts
Proposition 4 provided an explicit expression for
the value of firm i’s development opportunity
Uiðx; KÞ as given in Equation (16). We address next
the equilibrium development efforts. Firm i’s objec-
tive is to maximize the value of its development
opportunity, net of development costs Di, that is, to
maximize
Ji x; ;Dð Þ :¼ Ui x;Kð;DÞð Þ Di: ð24Þ
We note by Diðx; ; DiÞ 2 Rþ the solution to the
optimization problem
Diðx; ;DiÞ :¼ arg sup
Di  0
Ji

x; ;
 Di
Di

: ð25Þ
Provided a unique solution exists for each tuple
ðx; ; DiÞ, we define firm i’s reaction function
Di 7!Diðx; ; DiÞ and introduce Dðx; ; DÞ ¼
ðDiðx; ; DiÞÞi. A MNE is a solution D^ðx; Þ 2 Rmþ
to the fixed-point equation
D

x; ; D^ðx; Þ	 ¼ D^ðx; Þ: ð26Þ
Solving Equation (25) is not straightforward
because we cannot readily differentiate the function
Di 7!Uiðx; Kð; DÞÞ given by Equation (16). We thus
proceed numerically, adopting an iterative scheme
akin to Cournot ta^tonnement process. We consider x
and k as parameters and fix an initial vector
D0 ¼ ð0Þi. In each iteration step n for a given vector
Dn, we determine firm i’s optimal reaction
Diðx; ; DniÞ to the rivals’ strategies Dni and then
replace Dn by Dnþ1 ¼ Diðx; ; D
n
iÞ
Dni
 
. We consider
all firms in sequence and then reiterate the procedure
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until the scheme converges to the fixed point D^ðx; Þ
in Equation (26).5
6. Numerical Illustrations and
Comparative Statics
We next provide numerical analyses to illustrate
application of our findings and derive further model
insights via comparative statics. In the base case, we
contextualize our model in the setting of disruptive
innovations in the automotive sector. Although we
aim for a realistic choice of parameter values satisfy-
ing constraint (9), we do not claim perfect calibration
with industry data. Table 1 presents two sets of
parameters: set 1 is the base case and set 2 is used for
robustness. The long-term riskfree interest rate
q = 0.03 is based on the 30-year US Treasury bill rate.
The effective interest rate is adjusted to account for the
risk of sudden market displacement or “exponential
decay” at a rate of ϱ = 0.01. This yields an effective dis-
count rate of r = q + ϱ = 0.04. The base volatility esti-
mate of 20% is in line with the current option-implied
volatility of select (listed) automotive OEMs, such as
Ford, Honda, and Toyota. In base-case Set 1, we set a
risk-neutral drift l at zero to focus on the effect of
uncertainty, but allow for some positive growth l in Set
2. The production cost parameters are chosen such that
the incumbent (firm 1) has an advantage over its rivals
(firms 2 and 3) in scaling up production and distribu-
tion. These parameter values are varied in comparative
statics analyses. We assume symmetry with respect to
the fixed costs fi ¼ 0 and Ii ¼ 250 to focus on the effect
of differentials in development and production.
6.1. “Competitive Waves” from Rival Entries
We focus on firm market-entry decisions by consider-
ing m = 3 firms with successful prototypes. Figure 2
illustrates the (equilibrium) shared investment option
values x 7!Ui
 
x;
 
1
1
1
!!
[as per Proposition 4], for
the two parameter sets of Table 1.
Contrary to standard European call options, shared
investment option values are not necessarily convex
increasing. They rather exhibit “competitive waves” of
Table 1 Parameter Values for Numerical Analyses
Set 1
(base case)
Set 2
(robustness)
Demand Risk-neutral drift l = 0.00 l = 0.01
Volatility r = 0.19 r = 0.10
Slope b = 5
Production costs Fixed fi ¼ 0
Linear d = 10
Quadratic ðc1; c2; c3Þ ¼ ð0:5; 0:75; 1:0Þ
Investment
opportunity
Horizon (maturity) T = 1
Entry cost Ii ¼ 250
Discount rate Riskfree rate q = 0.03
Exponential
decay rate
ϱ = 0.01
Effective rate r = q + ϱ = 0.04
(a) (b)
Figure 2 Values of the Market-Entry Option x 7!Ui x ;
1
1
1
0
@
1
A
0
@
1
A for Three Firms for the Two Sets of Table 1
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alternating convex and concave segments.6 The
option payoff of firm 1 most benefiting from econo-
mies of scale (the “incumbent”) is increasing faster at
low demand; this is so because if it operates in the
market (x1  XT  x2), it benefits from demand
increases enjoying a monopoly status. In Figure 2a, an
inflection is seen for x 7!U1

x;
1
1
1
0
@
1
A close to firm
2’s entry threshold x2; this is so because for
x1  XT\ x2 only firm 1 operates in the market (as a
monopolist), while for x2  XT\ x3 firm 2 also enters,
resulting in (lower) duopoly profits for firm 1.
Another inflection takes place close to demand
threshold x3 above which firm 3 enters. The value of
the least cost-efficient firm (firm 3) does not exhibit
the “competitive wave” pattern (and behaves like a
standard European call option) because, as a last
entrant, firm 3 invests when rivals are already “in.” In
Figure 2, whether the “tide” of these waves is located
before or after threshold xi depends on the relative
values of l and r (influencing the distribution of XT)
and of r (affecting the discounted value). We next
focus on the “base case” (Set 1 in Table 1) to derive
insights by comparative statics.
Figure 3 shows variations of the base case (set 1) to
stress the impact of demand volatility r and the hori-
zon until market entry T on firms’ entry thresholds
and values. The competitive waves are more pro-
nounced in panel d for lower volatility (r = 0.10)
and/or shorter maturity (T = 0.25). In the face of high
volatility r or longer horizon until market entry T, the
shifts in value caused by rival entry smooth out:
greater cumulative demand volatility (r
ﬃﬃﬃ
T
p
) leads to
more dispersed future demand XT and lower pre-
dictability of future strategic interactions.
6.2. Illustration of MNE Development Efforts
Above, we assumed all three firms will have a suc-
cessful prototype, that is, K ¼
1
1
1
0
@
1
A. However, a
firm’s chance of prototype success Kiði; DÞ and its
reward Jiðx; ; DÞ in Equation (24) actually depend on
the development efforts D exerted by all rivals during
the development stage. For illustration, we specialize
the function Ki to
Kiði;DÞ :¼ 1 1 ið Þ exp wiðDi; gÞDið Þ: ð27Þ
Function Di 7!Kiði; DÞ is monotone increasing from
i to 1. The rate at which it increases is driven by
wiðDi; gÞ :¼ aið1 þ
P
j 6¼i DjÞg with a ¼ ðaiÞi 2 Rmþ
and the parameter g capturing the externality among
the firms’ development efforts. Firm i is more effective
than firm j at developing a prototype (“more
innovative”) if ai [ aj. With no externalities (g = 0),
there is no interaction between firms’ probabilities of
success. With positive externalities (g > 0), a firm
becomes more effective at developing a prototype
when a rival expends greater development effort; this
beneficial effect might arise due to imitation, greater
public awareness, network effects (e.g., EV charging
infrastructure, navigation platforms) or more intense
collective lobbying. If externalities are negative (g < 0),
a firm needs to exert larger effort to attain a given
probability of prototype success; this may be the case if
firms compete over scarce human resources (e.g., AI
specialists).
For illustration, suppose (27) involves a headstart
among firms with  ¼
0
0:1
0:2
0
@
1
A. Given the base-case
parameters (Set 1 in Table 1), we can now profile the
three firms. Firm 1 excels at exploiting economies of
scale (c1\ c2\ c3) but has limited innovation capa-
bility—much like an established incumbent trapped
in the classic “productivity dilemma” (Abernathy
1978). On the other end, firm 3 has a headstart
(3 [ 2 [ 1) and is more effective at developing
the prototype further (a3 [ a2 [ a1), yet it is less
capable to ramp up production and distribute.
Firm 2 fares better than firm 3 in terms of produc-
tion efficiency but less so than incumbent firm 1.
Firm 2 is also more effective at developing a proto-
type than established firm 1 but less effective than
firm 3.
6.2.1. Reaction Functions and Externality Effects
in a Duopoly. Illustrating reaction functions is easier
in two-player games, so in this section we focus on a
duopoly involving an incumbent (firm 1) and an inno-
vator (here, firm 2). Figure 4 depicts their reaction
functions for situations characterized by distinct
degrees of externalities. The externalities are assumed
negligible (g = 0) in panel a. Here, one firm’s efforts to
develop a prototype reduce the other firm’s chances to
wield market power in the future as both would oper-
ate at large demand XT if they hold a viable prototype;
development efforts are thus strategic substitutes (re-
action functions are downward-sloping). The equilib-
rium development efforts D^ðx; Þ in Figure 4
correspond to the coordinates of the (bold) points at
which the reaction functions intersect (e.g., point A for
x = 10). Whether a greater effort is expended by the
incumbent or the innovator (as can be seen from the
45-degree line in Figure 4) depends on the current
market outlook (current demand state x). If the market
is a niche (low demand x = 10), the innovator would
expend greater effort [D^2ð10; Þ [ D^1ð10; Þ at point
A]: the innovator expends development effort at a cost
advantage while the incumbent reduces its effort in
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reaction (given strategic substitutability). If the market
is sufficiently large to accommodate both (e.g., if
x = 20), the incumbent (firm 1) puts greater effort to
develop a prototype [D^2ð20; Þ\ D^1ð20; Þ at point B]
despite being less efficient in development; it does so
to improve its chances to subsequently benefit from
economies of scale.
Externalities can also affect the equilibrium devel-
opment efforts D^ðx; Þ in Equation (26). Positive exter-
nalities—shown for g = 0.2 in Figure 4b—enhance the
incumbent’s effectiveness at developing its own pro-
totype, so the incumbent needs to expend less effort
(vs. panel a) to achieve a given probability of success.
The innovator also exerts less effort because it does
not want the incumbent to free-ride (given strategic
substitutability). Consequently, the NE points A and
B shift to the bottom left corner (vs. panel a). In panel
b, for both demand states (x = 10 and 20), the incum-
bent expends the greater effort in NE.
In the case of negative externalities—illustrated for
g = 0.2 in Figure 4c—each firm’s development effort
reduces the efficiency of the other’s. Whether devel-
opment efforts are strategic substitutes or comple-
ments here depends on the demand state x. At low
initial demand (x = 10), the reaction functions are
monotone decreasing, representing strategic substi-
tutability, while at high demand (x = 20) a firm’s reac-
tion function is first monotone increasing (up to a
certain level), exhibiting strategic complementarity,
and then decreasing, exhibiting strategic substi-
tutability. When the market is likely to accommodate
only one rival (x = 10), engaging in a costly develop-
ment race is not rational for either firm; this leads to
strategic substitutability. But when the market can
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3 Comparative Statics on Market-Entry Option Values x 7!Ui x ;
1
1
1
0
@
1
A
0
@
1
A in a Triopoly with Respect to Demand Volatility r and the Market-
Entry Time (maturity) T
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accommodate more firms (x = 20), each firm is willing
to go the extra mile to counteract the reduced effi-
ciency induced by negative externalities as both firms
vie for a more lucrative market.7 The innovator (firm
2) has better prospects in the development race
because it does not need to expend as much effort to
overcome this inefficiency.
6.2.2. Impact of Demand Characteristics on
Equilibrium Development Efforts. Our previous
discussion related to the strategic interactions for
given demand x = 10 or 20. We now illustrate further
the effect of demand changes on the equilibrium
development efforts.
Innovator vs. Incumbent in Duopoly. Figure 5
depicts duopoly firms’ NE development efforts
D^iðx; Þ across a range of demand states x. A firm will
not put any effort to develop a prototype (with
D^iðx; Þ ¼ 0) if demand is low (x  xHi ). If a firm puts
an effort (x  xHi ), then its effort D^iðx; Þ increases
with demand x. Upon market entry, the payoff
x 7!Wi

x;

1
i

grows at a higher rate for the
incumbent (firm 1) than for the innovator (2) due to
the incumbent’s more efficient production
[H1ðÞ  H2ðÞ]. As the innovator (firm 2) has an
advantage in development [a2 [ a1] and the incum-
bent (firm 1) in production, there exists a threshold
xA  xH1 below (resp. above) which the innovator
(resp., the incumbent) expends the greater effort.
If the market is likely to accommodate only one
firm, the innovator develops the technology at a
lower cost, while the incumbent refrains. If the mar-
ket prospects improve, the incumbent expends more
effort to enhance its chances of success, despite its
disadvantage in development (with a1\ a2), while
the innovator backs down (given strategic substi-
tutability) for negligible or positive externalities. If
externalities are negative (g = 0.2 as in panel c),
the incumbent’s decision to develop a prototype
above xH1 is an adverse development, which the
innovator must counter to be successful; this results
in an up jump in the innovator’s efforts D^2ð; Þ to
the right of xH1 .
8
Middle Firm in Triopoly. Figure 6 provides com-
parative statics on equilibrium development efforts in
a triopoly. Here, firm 3 is the innovator and firm 2 is a
middle firm, excelling neither in development nor pro-
duction but faring well overall. At low demand
x\ xA, the innovator (firm 3) exerts the greatest
development effort, while for large demand x  xC the
incumbent (firm 1) does so. In the intermediate
demand region xA  x\ xC, the middle firm (2) puts
the greatest effort as it would benefit more from econo-
mies of scale at market entry than the innovator [as
H2ðÞ [ H3ðÞ] while being more effective at develop-
ing a viable prototype than the incumbent [as a2 [ a3].
In a subset of this demand region—namely ½xB; xCÞ—
the incumbent exerts a greater effort than the innova-
tor. The region ½xA; xCÞ expands if the middle firm is
better at developing a prototype (from a2 ¼ 0:0045
in the left panel to 0.012 in the right panel), resem-
bling an innovative firm (3). By contrast, if the mid-
dle firm becomes less efficient at ramping up
production (from c2 ¼ 0:75 in panels a and b to 0.95
in panels c and d), like the innovator (firm 3), the
range of demand ½xA; xCÞ for which the middle firm
exerts the greatest effort would shrink somewhat.
Figure 7 illustrates the equilibrium development
efforts depending on demand volatility r for a given
demand state (x = 20 or 30). For a given demand level
x, there is a cut-off volatility level rHi ðxÞ below which
firm iwould not invest in development activities. This
cut-off rHi ðxÞ decreases in demand x (panel b vs. panel
a) because better demand prospects x do not necessi-
tate volatility to be as large for the market to be attrac-
tive. The development effort of the incumbent (firm 1)
takes off at a higher volatility than the innovator’s
(rH1 [ r
H
3 ), but it is steeper. The incumbent is less effi-
cient in development, yet it benefits more from
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4 Reaction Functions Di 7!Di ðx ; ; Di Þ in a Duopoly for Different Demand States x and Externality Effects g
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5 Comparative Statics on Equilibrium Development Efforts x 7! D^i ðx ; Þ in a Duopoly with Respect to Externality Effects g at Different Levels
of Demand x
(a) (b)
Figure 6 Comparative Statics on Equilibrium Development Efforts x 7! D^i ðx ; Þ in a Triopoly with Respect to the “Middle” Firm’s Development
Efficiency Parameter a2. We Assume No Externalities (g = 0)
(a) (b)
Figure 7 Comparative Statics on Equilibrium Development Efforts D^i with Respect to Demand Volatility r at Different Levels of Demand x. We
Assume No Externalities (g = 0)
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demand volatility because its market-entry and out-
put expansion options become more valuable. This
tension helps explain why the incumbent only starts
investing in development activities if the market is
more uncertain, but then it exerts a greater develop-
ment effort, while the innovator backs down (given
strategic substitutability). This logic applies to the
middle firm as well.
Figure 8 depicts the impact of changes to the
middle firm’s profile (parameters a2 and c2) on
equilibrium firm values x 7! Jiðx; ; D^ðx; ÞÞ. The
incumbent’s value J1ðx; ; D^ðx; ÞÞ crosses the inno-
vator’s J3ðx; ; D^ðx; ÞÞ at point A, while the
middle firm’s value J2ðx; ; D^ðx; ÞÞ crosses the
incumbent’s J1ðx; ; D^ðx; ÞÞ at B. The relative rank-
ing of coordinates xA and xB depends on the
degree of heterogeneity with respect to ai and ci. In
panel a, the innovator’s value exceeds that of its
rivals if the market remains a niche (x\ xA), but is
lowest as production efficiency gives more edge to
the incumbent (x  xA). In panel b, where the mid-
dle firm becomes more efficient in development, it
is worth more than the innovator in the region
ð0; xBÞ, which is a subset of ð0; xAÞ. In panel c,
where the middle firm’s production efficiency c2
declines, the region ½xB; xAÞ where the incumbent
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 8 Comparative Statics for Equilibrium Firm Values x 7! Ji ðx ; ; D^ðx ; ÞÞ with Respect to the Middle Firm’s Cost Parameters c2 and a2 in a
Triopoly. We Assume No Externalities (g = 0)
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(1) is worth more than middle firm 2, widens; in
panel d, the disadvantage of one firm relative to
the others fades.
6.2.3. Likelihood of Successful Prototype
Development and Market Entry. Equilibrium devel-
opment efforts D^iðx; Þ influence the prototype suc-
cess probabilities Kð; D^ðx; ÞÞ via Equation (27) and
eventually firms’ likelihood of market entry. Given
the coordination game resolution in Proposition 3,
one can derive predictions about industry structure in
the face of technological and market uncertainty. Fig-
ure 9 illustrates (for the base case) the probabilities of
prototype development success (black line) and of
market entry (gray). Because prototype success is a
prerequisite for market entry, the gray curves are
bounded above by the black curves. For low demand
(x  xH2 ), the middle firm and the innovator benefit
from a headstart in development, yet are not likely to
enter given low market prospects. When the middle
firm decides to exert an effort (at the right of xH2 ) the
innovator (firm 3) is less likely to enter. In Figure 9,
the two curves for firms 1 and 2 are hardly distin-
guishable beyond xH2 because these firms only invest
in development if their prospects for successful mar-
ket-entry are tangible, whereas the innovator can
afford to be more speculative given its greater capa-
bility in development.
7. Conclusion
We derived the value of a firm’s shared compound
option to develop a prototype, enter the market and
produce flexibly alongside several heterogeneous riv-
als. Our result generalizes the BSM formula allowing
for firm-specific development success probabilities,
heterogeneous market-entry and production costs
and for differential capabilities to develop a technol-
ogy or exploit economies of scale in production. We
then use our model to derive insights on oligopoly
firms’ equilibrium development efforts.
We solve the coordination problem that arises
when two or more firms successfully developed
viable prototypes while demand is not yet sufficient
to accommodate them all. In configurations involving
multiple Nash equilibria in entry decisions, we favor
the equilibrium where incumbents with viable proto-
types enter at the expense of start-up entrants. We
derived the demand thresholds above which rival
firms with a viable prototype will enter. We deter-
mined an explicit expression generalizing the BSM
formula for the value of a firm’s shared option to
enter the market taking account of firms’ probabilities
of prototype success and developed an iterative
scheme to determine the equilibrium development
efforts. We also provided numerical illustrations and
comparative statics.
Our analysis has led to several interesting findings.
It may be optimal for a firm to enter a niche market
and stay put for a while if long-term growth prospects
prevail over short-term considerations. In contrast to
standard call options, the shared option value in oli-
gopoly is not convex or monotone increasing in the
state of demand, but it rather exhibits “competitive
waves” due to rival entries. These waves are more
pronounced when demand volatility or the time
remaining until the window of opportunity closes is
small. If initial demand is low, an innovator invests
more in development, whereas an incumbent invests
more if demand is large. Positive externalities reduce
the disadvantage of an incumbent in development,
making it more prone to innovate. Negative externali-
ties generally favor a start-up innovator as it can
counter the negative impact of the incumbent’s devel-
opment efforts more effectively. A middle firm which
excels neither in innovation nor in production may
put a greater effort than either rival if demand is in
the intermediate region because it can more effec-
tively develop a viable prototype than the incumbent
while it can benefit more from demand surges by
expanding output at a lower cost than the innovator.
Demand volatility, by virtue of enhancing the value
of firms’ market-entry and production flexibility
options, gives a greater incentive for firms to invest in
development. As a result, the threshold above which
Figure 9 Probabilities of Prototype Development Success
x 7!Kð; D^i ðx ; ÞÞ and of Market Entry
x 7!PKð~i ðx ; sÞ ¼ 1Þ in a Triopoly. We Assume No Exter-
nalities (g = 0)
Chevalier-Roignant, Flath, and Trigeorgis: Disruptive Innovation and Market Entry
Production and Operations Management 28(7), pp. 1641–1657, © 2019 The Authors. Production and Operations Management published by
Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of Production and Operations Management Society 1655
firms exert development efforts is lower and more
development activities take place.
Our article contributes to extant literature on dis-
ruptive innovation by analyzing the impact of hetero-
geneous cost profiles on industry equilibria. Our
model is quite general and allows to accommodate
many rival firms and firm heterogeneity. In our
numerical illustrations, we focused primarily on
heterogeneity with respect to development effective-
ness (ai) and diseconomies of scale (ci), but analyzing
the effect of differences in head-start (i), entry costs
(Ii) and fixed operating expenses (fi) is also feasible
given our model. Our framework has certain limita-
tions, which present opportunities for future research.
We have left out explicit considerations of capacity
constraints. Treating capacity choices as endogenous
(as in Bensoussan and Chevalier-Roignant 2019)
would add further complexity but promises to yield
additional insights. Future research might also con-
sider firms that precommit to a strategic stance, e.g.,
to commercialize the prototype (if successful) “no
matter what” or to accelerate market entry. Relaxing
these might yield further insights on preemptive
behavior in oligopoly. The information structure in
our setup is also restrictive as it rests on the assump-
tion that parameter values and states are public
knowledge. Parameters are also assumed to remain
fixed. Certain information (and parameter values)
may remain private or evolve, while others may be
public knowledge. In a world where the media are
keen to report on new technological developments,
firms are likely to revise their information set on mar-
ket characteristics and rival cost profiles. Firms may
also have blurred beliefs about certain parameter val-
ues and states at earlier stages and update them over
time (with potential time delays). Control-theoretic
methods relying on filtering theory can help deal with
“partially observed systems” (see, e.g, Bensoussan
2004, Bensoussan et al. 2007).
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Notes
1The “window of opportunity” for a firm to commercialize
a product innovation begins when a dominant product
design or category emerges (Christensen et al. 1998,
Suarez et al. 2015) and ends once process optimization
takes over (Klepper 2002). Our above assumption may
seem somewhat extreme (as the start and end of this nar-
row “window” presumably coincide) but it reasonably
captures settings—such as our industry examples—where
the “window” is short-lived. Owing to this closing “win-
dow of opportunity,” the product is homogeneous across
firms from time T onwards. VR headsets are already
homogeneous products. While the market for the “car of
the future” may admit several segments, experts expect
convergence of key components (electric drive train, cam-
era system, LIDAR lasers).
2The affine-cost case (ci ¼ 0 for all i) is well-known (see,
e.g., Kulatilaka and Perotti 1998, Tirole 1988): it yields
HiðÞ ¼ ½bð
P
j j þ 1Þ21.
3In Equations (10) and (11) the subscript “A/B” should
read “A” or “B:” the choice of A vs. B in cA=B determines
whether it should be a “+” or a “” on the RHS of
Equation (10).
4One can retrieve the Cournot duopoly results in Kulati-
laka and Perotti (1998, p. 1026) by setting c = 0, 1, 2 and
r = 0 in Equation (18), obtaining 19Ex½ðx  dÞþ2 ¼
1
9 ½x2er
2
Nd2  2xdNd1 þ d2Nd0:
5We do not claim existence and uniqueness of MNE in
general. In our numerical analyses, we did not face issues
of nonexistence or nonuniqueness, except for the particu-
lar case described in note 7.
6The existence of such competitive waves is somewhat
reminiscent of shared investment option value findings in
the duopoly model of Dixit and Pindyck (1994, chapter
9). In both cases, the entry of a rival causes an inflection
at a threshold value. The underlying premises are quite
different, however. In the American-type option setting
of Dixit and Pindyck, the option value of a “first mover”
exhibits an inflection at the value of the stochastic vari-
able above which a “second mover” enters. Our model
relies on the “window of opportunity,” ruling out the
first vs. second-mover roles. We focus instead on firm
real options as European-type options. The above com-
parison should thus be interpreted with some caution
because comparing American and European options may
not be as meaningful.
7The existence of a pure-strategy NE is not always assured
for negative externalities. We drop parameters x and k in
the notations and provide a formal argument in a duopoly
for which firm i’s reaction function DiðÞ is increasing on
ð0; DHiÞ and decreasing on ðDHi; 1Þ. In the first iteration,
firm 1 responds to firm 2’s effort 0 by making an effort
D11 ¼ D1ð0Þ  0. If D11 2 ð0; DH1 Þ, then D12 ¼ D2ðD11Þ 
D2ðD01Þ  0. Now if D12 2 ð0; DH2 Þ, firm 1 makes an effort
D21 ¼ D1ðD12Þ  D1ð0Þ ¼ D11. This mechanism goes on
beyond n = 2. The sequence of best responses
fðDn1 ; Dn2Þgn 0 is at first increasing. Yet, if there exists an
integer nH such that Dn
H
2  DH2 , firm 1’s reaction function
D1ðÞ is monotone decreasing (strategic substitutes), lead-
ing firm 1 to reduce its development effort Dn
Hþ1
1  Dn
H
1 .
In such a situation the sequence fðDn1 ; Dn2Þgn 0 might not
converge as n ↑ ∞, precluding the existence of a pure-
strategy NE.
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8As noted in endnote 7, in this case there is no pure-strat-
egy Nash equilibrium in the right vicinity of xH1 .
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